Harry Hopkins: A Glimpse into the Russian Records

Harry Hopkins: A Glimpse into the Russian Records

I. Harry Hopkins in Russian Diplomatic Files

On December 1, 1938, Constantine Oumansky, then the Soviet Chargé d’affaires ad interim in the United States, wrote in his “political letter” to Maxim Litvinov, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs:

… His [FDR’s] circle remains progressive, there have been no obvious shifts to the right in his domestic policy. He strongly hates the Nazis and the Japanese; however, he is getting increasingly concerned with the activation of reactionaries, which are at present mostly concentrated in the Dies Congressional Committee. …

… [The Dies Committee] has turned into an office of daily baiting of the progressive wing of [the] Roosevelt Administration, and Roosevelt obviously feels the need to publicly distance [himself] from the support on the left, although thus far he has not sacrificed his most progressive assistants like [verbatim “of the type”] Ickes [Harold L. Ickes, then Secretary of the Interior] and Hopkins. … ¹

Hopkins begins to appear more frequently in Russian diplomatic files after his first visit to Moscow in late July, 1941; for example, see the reference below, “On the Issue of American Assistance to the USSR,” compiled at the NKID’s department of the Americas, dated September 21, 1941:

… The representative of the U.S. President Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, who is supervising the implementation of the Lend-Lease law, in his radio address on July 27, that is, before his departure from London to Moscow, stated: “We are not forgetting about the glorious struggle of the Russian people, who are defending their Motherland. We in America are resolved to provide all possible assistance to Russia, and to do it immediately.”

In his statement to the correspondents of the foreign press on July 30, Hopkins stated that on the instruction of the President he informed Comrade Stalin that “the United States considers anyone fighting against Hitler [to be on the] righteous side in this conflict, and it is our intention to provide assistance to that side.” Hopkins also stated that, “we (in the United States) are watching the struggle of the Soviet Union in self-defense with great admiration.” ²

Judging from the Russian records, the Soviets appreciated Hopkins’s role from the very beginning. Talking to a representative of the American Red Cross, J. Nickolson [James T. Nickolson – S.Ch.], Andrey Vyshinsky, the First Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, said that “the assistance provided to the Soviet Union by President Roosevelt, who is a shrewd statesman, as well as by his associates – Hopkins, Harriman, Davies [former Ambassador to the USSR Joseph E. Davies – S. Ch.] and the others is highly appreciated.” According to Vyshinsky’s record of the conversation, “Nickolson replied that he appreciated my sincerity and that he agreed with me in full… He asked for permission to cite me in his conversation with Roosevelt, Hopkins, Wardwell and his boss, Davis [Norman Davis, chairman of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies from 1938 to 1944 – S.Ch.].” ³

Hopkins appears in the Russian files as one of the early supporters of opening a second front in Europe. See, for instance, the once Top Secret record of a conversation between Vyacheslav Molotov, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, [John Gilbert] Winant, on Molotov’s visit to London in May 1942, when he was on his way to Washington, D.C.:

… Further, Winant touched upon the issue of the second front and said that Roosevelt was its zealous partisan, and that Molotov would also find full support from Hopkins and General Marshall.

As far as England is concerned, at the time of Hopkins and Marshall’s stay in London, this issue enjoyed a great deal of attention, mostly thanks to the enthusiasm and resolve of the American representatives. Following their departure, the attitude to the second front among the English government has somewhat soured…. ⁴

In Washington, Hopkins took part in Roosevelt’s meetings with Molotov – appearing as No 1 or No 2 on the attendance lists in the Soviet records of the conversations of May 29-30, 1942. ⁵

Throughout the war years, Hopkins continually appeared in Soviet diplomatic reports on Soviet-American relations among the staunchest supporters of President Roosevelt. For instance, a report on the state of Soviet-American relations, written by Andrey Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador in the United States, in July 1944, summing up developments since June 1941, concluded “that Roosevelt and his Administration have taken a firm line in support of friendly relations and cooperation with the Soviet Union.” In this connection, Gromyko named Hopkins at the top of his list of Roosevelt’s “most active supporters among non-Cabinet people” – before Vice-President Wallace and future Secretary of State Edward Stettinius. ⁶

Hopkins continually appears in Russian diplomatic files as a final authority on American supplies to the USSR – as, for instance, in Ambassador Gromyko’s record of his conversation with Ambassador Harriman on July 31, 1944:

On July 31, I attended the dinner at the [residence of ] U.S. Ambassador Harriman. …

… Harriman remarked that Mikoyan [Anastas Mikoyan, then the People’s Commissar of Foreign and Domestic Trade – S. Ch.] is not completely satisfied with the response given by the American Government, because he believes that the American Government could increase its supplies of materials in excess of the 5,400 tons. Harriman informed Hopkins about the opinion expressed by Mikoyan. He has not yet received a response from Hopkins on the possibility of increasing the volume of supplies in comparison with the number indicated above. … ⁷

The name Harry Hopkins, written without any title, also appears on top of the lists of American participants at the Tehran and Yalta Conferences of the Big Three, as, for instance, in the list of President Roosevelt’s “personal group” at the Yalta Conference, which Harriman handed over to Molotov on January 2, 1945:

TOPSECRET

The President’s personal group will include a total of about 100. …

The President’s personal group will include:

Mr. Harry Hopkins

Vice-Admiral McIntire – Personal physician to the President

Vice-Admiral Brown – The President’s Naval Aide

Major General Watson – The President’s Military Aide and Personal Secretary

Mr. Charles E. Bohlen – Will act as an interpreter

White House Staff —- 6

Secret Service Officers 16

Servants —————— 8 ⁸

In the course of preparations for the Yalta Conference, Ambassador Harriman requested an audience with Molotov on January 20 to talk at length about the American agenda for the conference. Molotov’s entry about the conversation in his books includes Harriman’s alert on Hopkins’s role in the coming meeting – appearing without a title or first name: “The President will also be accompanied by Hopkins who will take part in the discussion of all questions. ⁹

In the official Soviet communiqué on the Yalta Conference, Hopkins appears as No. 3 on the list of American participants:

From the USA:

E. Stettinius, the Secretary of State

B. Leahy, head of the President’s HQ, Fleet Admiral

H. Hopkins, Presidential Special Assistant

J. Byrnes, Judge, Director, Department of War Mobilization

G. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army

E. King, Commander-in-chief of the Navy

B. Somerwell, Commander, U.S. Army War Supplies

E. Lang, Administrator, Naval transportation

L. Cooter, Major-General

Av. Harriman, Ambassador to the USSR

Ph. Mathews, Director, European department of the State Department

A. Hiss , Deputy Director, Office on Special Political Affairs, State Department

Ch. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, along with political, military and technical advisors. ¹⁰

In addition, Hopkins’s name appears in one of the more entertaining records I discovered in the Russian Yalta files:

Phone cable, February 9, 1945, 1.30 [pm] [from the NKID, Moscow, to Yalta – S. Ch.]

Chuvakhin [Dmitry Stepanovich Chuvakhin, then an official of the NKID – S. Ch.] – to Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Comrade A. J. Vyshinsky.

In the conversation with me Pench [a garbled transmission of the name of Edward Page – S.Ch.] told me that President Roosevelt, Stettinius, Hopkins and Byrnes expressed a desire to receive a small amount of caviar, champagne, cigarettes, wines and vodka. Pench added that many other members of the American delegation were looking forward to gifts, although everybody understood that it would probably be hard to do. Speaking for himself, Pench said that the minor members of the delegation could be given vodka and cigarettes as “souvenirs,” in case there is nothing else available.

I have promised to report it to the leadership. Chuvakhin

Transmitted via government communication system. ¹¹

This wish was immediately transmitted to Molotov and, apparently, acted upon.

A personal letter from Harry Hopkins to the Soviet Ambassador, Gromyko, discovered in the files of the Soviet Embassy in the United States, suggests a rather informal relationship between Hopkins and Gromyko. Hopkins wrote a letter on April 30, 1945 to ask Gromyko (who was then in San Francisco, attending the United Nations Charter Conference) to facilitate the issuing of a Soviet visa to the journalist Edgar Snow:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Personal

April 30, 1945

…

I have been laid up at home ever

since I left the hospital but I seem

to be getting a little better each day

and should be up and about before too

long now.

I surely hope that things go well

at San Francisco. It would be such a

tragic matter for the people of the

whole world if all of us fail out there.

I am sorry I could not see Mr. Molotov

while he was here and if you get a chance

will you remember me kindly to him?

Cordially yours,

Harry L. Hopkins ¹²

In San Francisco, Ambassador Gromyko obviously did remember Hopkins to Molotov, who wrote a private letter to Hopkins on May 5, 1945 to say that he was very sorry he hadn’t been able to see Hopkins on his brief trip to Washington before proceeding to San Francisco. ¹³

On the evening of Victory in Europe Day, May 8, 1945, Hopkins cabled Molotov in San Francisco. On top of the Russian translation of this cable, we see a notation in Molotov’s handwriting:

Important

UNCIO V STATE NR 20/8TH MAY 7 50PM EWT ROUTINE GF 82 BT

TO FOREIGN MINISTER MOLOTOV (PERSONAL)

FROM HARRY L. HOPKINS

MAY 8TH

THANKS SO MUCH FOR YOUR CORDIAL MESSAGE.

THIS DAY OF VICTORY OVER THE EVIL FORCES OF MANKIND WAS WON

BY MILLIONS OF ALLIED SOLDIERS AND SAILORS. IT IS THE PRELUDE, NOT

ONLY OF THE COMPLETE DISTRUCTION [sic] OF THE MILITARY MIGHT OF JAPAN, BUT

ALSO OF THE BUILDING OF A SURE FOUNDATION OF PEACE IN WHICH

THE COMMON PEOPLE OF THE EARTH SHALL SHARE THE FRUITS OF THE VICTORY.

HARRY HOPKINS ¹⁴

Hopkins appeared prominently in Russian diplomatic files for the last time between late May and early June of 1945, in connection with his last mission to Stalin as the personal representative of the president of the United States (now Harry Truman). This time, his goal was to iron out differences between the Allies over the Polish issue, which was jeopardizing the outcome of the San Francisco Conference.

On May 22, 1945, the U.S. Chargé d’affaires in Moscow, George Kennan, visited the Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Vyshinsky, to talk about the arrangements for Hopkins’s trip to Moscow. A brief record in Vyshinsky’s books says:

Reception of George Kennan, Chargé d’affaires (5 minutes).

… Hopkins is arriving in Paris accompanied by his wife approximately on May 25. Due to Hopkins’s weak health … [Kennan is] requesting to arrange for a direct flight through Berlin. ¹⁵

The Russian diplomatic protocol files recorded Vyshinsky’s arrangements for a comfortable stay in Moscow for Hopkins and his plane’s crew:

Secret, Urgent

“24” May 1945

A. Vyshinsky – to A.D. Kroutikov, Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Trade.

NKID is asking for [your] instruction to Intourist for allocating rooms at the “National” hotel for accommodation of the crew of the plane of the Personal Representative of the President of the United States – H. Hopkins who arrives in Moscow on May 26 c.[current] y. [year]. ¹⁶

A draft of the protocol for Hopkins’s welcoming ceremony in Moscow, discovered in the records of the Molotov Office, displays Vyshinsky’s last-minute editing to downplay the ceremony in comparison with the reception given to Hopkins in July 1941:

At the Central Airfield Hopkins is welcomed by:

A.J. Vyshinsky,

F.F. Molochkov [head of Protocol, NKID],

V.I. Bazykin [Assistant Head of the Department on the USA, NKID]

[The names of the Lt.-General Sinilov and M.-General Kutuzov were crossed out]

The Central Airfield is “not” [handwritten insertion] decorated with the flags of the SU and the USA. The honor guard is not [here and after, other handwritten insertions] present, national anthems are not played. … ¹⁷

Following Hopkins’s five conversations with Stalin on May 27, 28, 30 and 31, final accord was reached on June 6 – and Molotov immediately informed the Soviet ambassadors in London, Paris, Washington, D.C., Warsaw and Prague “on the agreements with H. Hopkins in the Polish question on June 6, 1945.” ¹⁸

On June 15, 1945, the Soviet daily “Izvestia” reported on President Truman’s June 13 press conference, where he recognized Hopkins’s mission to Moscow as “successful.” The article went on to cite Truman’s estimate of Hopkins’s accomplishments:

To the question if there were any changes that involved shifts in the policy of the Soviet government, Truman answered in the negative. He said that there had been amiable concessions on the part of the Russians on a number of issues of interest to Americans.

To the question if Hopkins’s activity led to the change in the positions of the Soviet delegation at San Francisco on the voting procedure in the Security Council, Truman answered with a strong affirmative. ¹⁹

Hopkins’s last mission received a rave review from the British – as seen in a record in the books of Soviet Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Ivan Maysky regarding his conversation with the British Ambassador in Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr, on June 13, 1945:

…

2. Having finished with the business part, Kerr moved on to various general topics. … He was especially happy about the prospect of a quick settlement of the Polish question. He gives great credit for it to Hopkins. Kerr even used the expression, “I wish Hopkins were English.” ²⁰

James F. Byrnes, who became President Truman’s Secretary of State on July 3, 1945, offered another rave review of Hopkins’s last mission when he spoke at a reception at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. on September 16, 1945. The Record of what he said was made by Molotov’s assistant:

Byrnes: … With no movement in the Polish situation [in the aftermath of the Yalta Conference – S. Ch.] … Americans got the impression that the accord on Poland had been broken. He, Byrnes, was well aware that that impression was wrong. Hopkins came to Moscow, made an agreement with Stalin, which resulted in reorganization of the Polish government that relieved the tension in the Polish question, and was welcomed by everybody.

There is no doubt that the present Polish government is friendly to the Soviet Union and that the United States are satisfied with the compromise reached. ²¹

II. Mentions of Harry Hopkins in Alexander Vassiliev’s Notebooks

In 1994 and 1995, Alexander Vassiliev, a former KGB officer and journalist, took voluminous notes on KGB files in preparation for a joint Russian-American book. In these notes, Vassiliev first mentions Harry Hopkins’s name in an undated report from the early 1930s. He refers to Hopkins as an “Asst. Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade,” who is “very much in favor of normal relations with the Soviets.” ²² Hopkins next appears in an April 1937 report on the “contacts, income, etc,” of someone with the pseudonym “Nigel”, (the cover name for NKVD short-term source Michael Straight), which was forwarded to Moscow Center. [22. Ibid., White Notebook # 3, p. 113.]] In March 1939, Hopkins’s name appeared in a report on “Nigel”’s employment options written by “Jung,” then the pseudonym of the Soviet “illegal” resident in the United States, Iskhak Akhmerov:

“On Nigel. … He was recently offered a job as secretary to Secretary of Commerce Harry Hopkins. [Rose {Roosevelt – S.Ch.} might lose the election in 1940, and Hopkins and his secretaries would leave with him. p.125] I dissuaded him from this option.” ²³

Hopkins next appeared in a brief note on a September 1, 1941 report from the agent “Informator.” According to the note, “Informator” reported on “Hopkins’s impressions from his trip to Moscow.” Hopkins’s name appears again in another report from “Informator,” dated October 6, 1941, which Vassiliev summarized as follows: “On Morgenthau’s annoyance over the passive attitude of Roosevelt and Hopkins toward real assistance to the USSR.” ²⁴

The importance of Vassiliev’s notes cannot be underestimated in considering the allegations that Hopkins was an agent of Soviet intelligence, which have at their source a 1990 book, KGB: The Inside Story of its Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, written by Christopher Andrew, a British historian, and Oleg Gordievsky, a former high-level KGB officer who had defected to the West in 1985.

Vassiliev’s notes on an “orientation” (that is, a memo written for the information of intelligence officers) on “Political and diplomatic line of work” [LINK to the image of the 1st page of the document], compiled in Moscow in April 1942 by a young NKGB operative, Vitaly Pavlov, are unequivocal on one significant point: that at the time the document was written, Hopkins was not a contact of Soviet intelligence – or even a recruitment target:

On the White House’s work: Those working are personally acquainted with Roosevelt (Morgenthau, Hopkins, Ickes, Welles, etc.) through personal contacts, oral reports, and personal envoys.

They avoid using channels like the Departments of State, War, the Navy, etc., in order to maintain secrecy. “Therefore it is understood that the aim of our day-to-day work is to infiltrate Roosevelt’s own circle.” So far there are no agents, but there are means of approach. One of Roosevelt’s secretaries, “Page,” (Page)] is being used without his knowledge.

Lead: to recruit Harry Hopkins’ secretary through the source “Diana.” ²⁵

Click here to compare Alexander Vassiliev’s notes on Vitaly Pavlov’s orientation with my translation of the actual full-length document

Vassiliev’s notes on a 1943 “Plan for reinforcing the intelligence work” in the United States also make it clear that, after the passage of a year, the Soviets still did not have any agents from “the circles of such individuals as Hopkins.” They did not even have “suitable cadres of qualified workers, capable of overseeing prominent and respectable agents” from such circles. ²⁶

On March 3, 1944, “Mer” (a code name for Akhmerov) reported to Moscow on a letter sent to Hopkins by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, protesting against an earlier agreement on wartime cooperation between the OSS and NKGB foreign intelligence. Akhmerov gives no hint in his report that Hopkins might have been his source. ²⁷ Moreover, if Hopkins had ever been Akhmerov’s contact – not to mention his agent – his name would have been hidden behind a pseudonym.

Hopkins’s name is mentioned again in the clear in a December 12, 1944 report by the Soviet People’s Commissar of State Security (GB), Vsevolod Merkulov, which was sent to Stalin, Molotov and Beria. Moreover, Hopkins’s name appears in a British diplomatic communiqué on the appointment of Edward Stettinius as the new U.S. Secretary of State, which was “obtained in London through an agent”:

The most important and immediate result of this appointment is a closer relationship between the State Department and the White House, which undoubtedly is a positive development. Stettinius is a loyal protégé of Hopkins and never forgets it… The president’s intention now to conduct his own foreign policy is becoming increasingly noticeable, Hopkins’s old (New Deal) prejudices against the bureaucratism of the State Department, at least recently, have faded, and he is working with individual leaders of the department on a wider scale than before. This tactics will be implemented even on a wider scale after Stettinius’s appointment. Since the important strategic posts have been filled by such people as Forrestal, Harriman and now by Stettinius (Forrestal is the US Navy secretary; Harriman, the US ambassador to the USSR—our note15), the White House and Hopkins in particular are getting more complete control than ever…” ²⁸

If Hopkins had been in contact with Akhmerov, it would have been more natural for Akhmerov to get this information directly from him, rather than in a roundabout way through London.

This was obviously not the case, since, according to Vassiliev’s notes, the NKGB relied on “Homer,”, its British source in Washington, D.C., to evaluate the effect of Hopkins’s mission to Moscow at the height of the San Francisco Conference. A report sent to Stalin, Molotov and Beria on June 15, 1945 said in part:

The Hopkins mission and the reports of the cordial reception he got from Stalin had a calming effect, and the Amer. govt. clearly sensed that the anti-Russian campaign had become so acrimonious that the need has arisen for restraining measures. As a result there have been a number of engineered statements aimed at calming the atmosphere. The most important of these statements was an address by Stettinius—a model of caution and tact. ²⁹

Hopkins appears in Vassiliev’s notebooks for the last time in the notes on a February 1952 report about a visit by someone hidden behind the cover name “Miron” to the office of a certain “Synok” [“Sonny”]. In Vassiliev’s notebooks, “Synok” was a cover name of Victor J. Hammer, a businessman who founded and owned the Hammer Galleries in New York City. The visit took place in Hammer’s office at the galleries, which were then located at 51 East 57th Street. “Sonny” is described as a person who was “auctioning off Roosevelt’s personal belongings” at that time: “He is well acquainted with Roosevelt’s wife and with R.’s former adviser Hopkins. He has also sold his [Hopkins’s] belongings and valuable gifts received when he carried out special missions.” ³⁰ Again, there is no hint of any past “special relationship” between Hopkins and NKVD foreign intelligence.

III. KGB Lt.-General Vitaly Pavlov on Allegations Made by Oleg Gordievsky

KGB Lt.-General Vitaly Pavlov (1914-2005) personally supervised the operations of Iskhak Akhmerov, the Soviet “illegal” resident in the United States, in 1939 and again from December 1941 until mid-1942. From the time of Akhmerov’s return to Moscow from his first U.S. mission, in the end of 1939, until his departure for his second mission, in late 1941, Pavlov – who was deputy head and then head of the KGB’s American section – was Akhmerov’s formal boss, and Akhmerov reported to him. Pavlov used to study Akhmerov’s operational file, as well as the files of his assistants and agents. Hence, Pavlov’s knowledge of the relationship – or, more truly, non-relationship – between Akhmerov and Harry Hopkins was firsthand.

Pavlov had a definite opinion about the allegation that Akhmerov had used Hopkins as a back channel, which appeared in the book KGB: The Inside Story of Its Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (1990). Pavlov said the following in interviews I conducted with him in April and May of 2002 (A. stands for Answer, Q. for Question):

A. … Gordievsky, the traitor, alleged that Akhmerov met with Hopkins, shook his hand and thanked him. I am saying that it is absurd! Akhmerov could not have met Hopkins and Hopkins never had anything to do with our intelligence.

Q. What is the source of your insistence that Akhmerov never met with Harry Hopkins and with Alger Hiss?

A. First, beginning in early 1939, as deputy head of the American section, I naturally read the materials which came from our residencies [stations] in the United States, including the illegal station headed by Akhmerov. After Akhmerov was recalled from the United States at the end of 1939 and particularly after he had been assigned to my section in early 1940…, he would tell me in great detail about his meetings in the United States. I was, naturally, interested in his intelligence capabilities…. Further, I was directly involved in the preparations for Akhmerov’s return to the United States – and supervised his operations in the first months of 1942, before I left for Canada in the summer of 1942…. During my time in Canada as NKGB “legal resident,” I was well-informed on the situation in the United States, because I used to come to New York from Canada from time to time…. At the time of [Gordievsky's] allegation about Hopkins [1990], we made a detailed check into Akhmerov’s circumstances in that period [and concluded]: there was no chance that Akhmerov had ever participated in any meeting at which Hopkins could have been present. Due to his [Akhmerov's] low social standing [in the United States] – petty businessman – there was no chance of his ever meeting Hopkins. … The nonsense [of Gordievsky’s allegations] was obvious. …

… To facilitate the Soviet Government’s relationship with the Roosevelt Administration [during World War II – S.Ch.] we did use our agents in U.S. government agencies … to obtain information on positions of certain individuals. … [For instance,] we were interested in people who came [to Russia] on missions – like Hopkins – [to ascertain] what their position and role was. But there was never any talk of their recruitment. …

Q. Speaking of the World War II period: to what extent was intelligence used as [a] back channel of communication between Stalin and Roosevelt? … Was there any participation of your intelligence service … to facilitate Stalin’s contacts with people like Hopkins?

A. Intelligence – no. Intelligence could have played a preliminary role by providing information about these people – their attitudes, their position, the chances of establishing cooperation with them, etc.

Q. Still, was Harry Hopkins an NKVD agent?

A. By no means! I have already said – I have written it in my memoirs – that Gordievsky, the traitor, alleged that Akhmerov shook hands with Harry Hopkins and thanked him for his assistance. It never happened – and was impossible! In the United States there was no chance for him [Akhmerov] to meet Hopkins – considering his circumstances and konspiratsija [secrecy rules] and his [Akhmerov’s] particular missions. ³¹