Communist Party SU/Verbatim Abstract from Protocol No 7 of the Meeting of the Politburo/May 25, 1934 (translation)

Verbatim Abstract from Protocol No 7, point 229/213, of the Meeting of the
Politburo of the Central Committee of VCP (b) ¹

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229/213. – The issues of the IV Directorate of RKKA

1. To recognize that the organizational system of the agent network of the IV Directorate, based on the principle of unification of agent networks providing service in any given nation within large field stations (“residenturas“), as well as on the concentration of communication networks with a number of field stations within a single station – is erroneous and involves the failure of a field station’s whole network in case of the failure of an individual agent. The [practice of] shifting workers [operatives] compromised in one nation to another nation was an outright violation of the rules of security [“konspiratsii”] and fertile ground for simultaneous failures in a number of countries.

2. The failures that had taken place demonstrated an insufficiently careful selection of agent operatives and their insufficient training. The vetting of the operatives of the IV Directorate posted overseas by the OGPU agencies was inadequate.

3. The agent operations of the IV Directorate have been poorly coordinated with the work of the Special Department and INO OGPU, resulting in misunderstandings between these agencies and their operatives.

4. The supervision of the agent work of the staffs of border districts has been decentralized and makes it possible for the local commanders to assign the agents operational and even organizational missions without coordination with the center.

5. The orientation of the operations of the IV Directorate to the coverage by clandestine intelligence (known as HUMINT) of almost all nations, including those of little interest to us, is wrong and results in dissipation of power and facilities.

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6. The orientation of the informational work to satisfying whatever requests [are received] from various military and military-industrial agencies is wrong and results in dispersion of the work, inadequately careful processing of incoming materials, [and] an active publishing activity which parallels that of the State Military Publishing House.

7. The Head of the IV Directorate did not pay adequate attention to clandestine intelligence work, which has resulted in a number of serious failures.

To eliminate the shortcomings listed above:

1. The People’s Commissar of the Army and Navy [“Narcomvoenmor”] must detach the IV Directorate from the Staff of the RKKA and bring it under direct supervision of the People’s Commissar (Narcom).

To retain within the Staff of the RKKA a single department in charge of the operational reconnaissance – linking [this department] with the work of the IV Directorate.

To avoid overburdening of the IV Directorate with insignificant missions, to establish assigning of missions only through the People’s Commissar or with his knowledge and approval. On the informational line , to reduce publishing activity to the publication of only those reference books and manuals that are indispensable for the RKKA.

To strengthen the leadership of the IV Directorate by [detailing] two or three prominent military workers with appropriate background. To fill the staff of intelligence agencies by detailing the most uncompromising, tested military workers with solid backgrounds.

2. To concentrate within the IV Directorate the supervision of the clandestine operations of the four District Departments – leaving to the District Command the right to assign operational intelligence requirements.

3. To compel the Head of the IV Directorate to restructure as soon as possible the whole system of clandestine intelligence work on the basis of creating small, absolutely autonomous agent groups unaware of each other. The work inside the groups should be organized in such a way that any single source would not know about the other. The communication between each group and the center should be established autonomously. The security in all the chains of the agent system should be strengthened as much as possible.

4. As soon as possible to establish a special intelligence school – to be staffed with carefully selected command and command-political officers who would be thoroughly vetted by the OGPU and Party organizations. In the selection process, [it will be necessary] to pay particular attention not only to social background, but also to nationality, considering that nationalistic feelings may be a source of treason and betrayal. The school should be organized for 200 people; classes should be organized separately for groups of 10-15 people.

5. The focus of the work of the military intelligence should be shifted to Poland, Germany, Finland, Rumania, England, Japan, Manchuria, China. The study of the armed forces of the remaining countries should be conducted in a legal way through official military representatives, probationers, military inspectors, etc.

6. For better coordination of the work of the IV Directorate with the Special Department and with INO OGPU:

a) Establish a standing commission including the heads of these agencies, assigning this commission the task of discussion and coordination of the overall plan for foreign intelligence; mutual information and warning about possible failures; sharing experience, careful study of failures and developing measures against failures; careful vetting of operatives sent on overseas missions, control and oversight over operatives working overseas.

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b) Appoint c.[omrade] Artuzov, the head of INO OGPU, as Assistant Head of the IV Directorate, with the commitment to spend two thirds of his work time on the IV Directorate.

The People’s Commissar of the Army and Navy c. [omrade] Voroshilov should personally supervise the realization of the outlined measures.

This verbatim abstract was sent to:
c.c. [comrades] Voroshilov, Jagoda, Berzin, Artuzov.